Unlocking the Arctic's Resources Equitably:Using a Law-and-Science Approach to Fix the Beaufort Sea Boundary by Bekker, Pieter & van de Poll, Robert
                                                                    
University of Dundee
Unlocking the Arctic's Resources Equitably
Bekker, Pieter; van de Poll, Robert
Published in:







Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bekker, P., & van de Poll, R. (2019). Unlocking the Arctic's Resources Equitably: Using a Law-and-Science
Approach to Fix the Beaufort Sea Boundary. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 35(2), 163-200.
https://doi.org/10.1163/15718085-23441076
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 29. May. 2021
 
Unlocking the Arctic’s Resources Equitably: Using a Law-
and-Science Approach to Fix the Beaufort Sea Boundary 
 
 Pieter Bekker 
Chair in International Law, CEPMLP University of Dundee, UK 
Email: p.bekker@dundee.ac.uk 
 Robert van de Poll 




This article analyzes the unresolved maritime boundary, situated in Arctic waters in the Beaufort Sea, 
between Canada and the United States (US) based on an integrated law-and-science approach. Resolving 
the Canada-US disagreement over the Beaufort Sea boundary based on modern geo-scientific 
technology and the three-step delimitation methodology developed by the jurisprudence of international 
courts and tribunals could serve as a catalyst for the peaceful and equitable resolution of all other 
unresolved boundaries in the Arctic Ocean. This includes the boundaries involving Russia, which can 
claim more than 40 percent of the Arctic shoreline. Given that the US is not a party to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, this article focuses on mechanisms available to Canada and the US 
under general international law and by applying “best law” and “best science.” 
 Keywords 




Fewer than half of the 500 or so potential maritime boundaries in the world have been agreed, creating 
uncertainty not only for the coastal States involved but also for investors active in the offshore oil and 
gas industry and in the fishing industry. The situation is no different in the Arctic Ocean, where a 
number of boundaries remain to be delimited. Defining with certainty the area of the Arctic seabed and 
subsoil in which circumpolar countries such as Canada and the US may exercise their sovereign rights 
over living marine species and natural resources is critical to their national interests in resource 
management, energy security and environmental protection. 
 Coastal States with competing claims to maritime areas routinely offer oil concessions in 
disputed waters without the investors taking blocks being fully aware of the underlying inter-State 
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dispute and the risks presented by an un-delimited boundary, especially one featuring straddling 
deposits. Underscoring this problem, the US state of Alaska issued a notification of a bid round 
comprising blocks lying in the area of overlapping claims in the Beaufort Sea that opened on 15 
November 2018.2 
 The modern law of the sea, which to a large extent has been codified in the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),3 as well as the related concept of maritime boundary delimitation reflect 
a mixture of law and science. This calls for a multi-disciplinary approach. The inter-connection between 
law (of the sea) and science (of plotting maritime boundaries) is most apparent in Article 76 of the 
UNCLOS, which deals with the continental shelf. That provision incorporates elements in its legal 
definition that require the input from non-legal specialists in maritime boundary delimitation, especially 
geo-scientists. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed in 1982, “the continental shelf is an 
institution of international law which, while it remains linked to a physical fact, it is not to be identified 
with the phenomenon designated by the same term—‘continental shelf’—in other disciplines.”4 Yet, as 
the submissions relating to an extended continental shelf (ECS) filed with the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a body of 21 geo-scientists established under the UNCLOS, and the 
emerging jurisprudence on ECS delimitations highlight,5 ultimately it is science and geography that 
determine whether a coastal State can lawfully claim sovereign rights over zones of maritime 
jurisdiction such as the ECS. Moreover, scientific advancements are driving the development of deep-
seabed exploration and exploitation, including in Arctic waters. 
 Maritime boundary delimitation essentially is a marine application that involves mapping, 
including of coastlines from which all boundary lines are drawn. As regards the standard for continental 
shelf delimitation, Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf (CCS) lays down the rule 
that “[i]n the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the [continental shelf] boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is 
measured.”6 This “equidistance/special circumstances” rule in the CCS, which also is employed for the 
delimitation of the territorial sea in Article 15 of the UNCLOS, has been assimilated with the rule of 
general international law requiring an “equitable result” based upon equitable principles. 
 Article 6 of the CCS underscores that the identification of baselines on a State’s coastline is the 
starting-point for every delimitation. This identification is based on a geo-scientific determination. 
Without coastlines, one cannot identify baselines—without baselines, it is impossible to determine the 
legal limits of zones of maritime jurisdiction, i.e., maritime boundaries.  
 In order to identify a baseline, which is established by drawing a notional, adjusted coastline that 
as a general rule tracks the tidal low-water line along the coast, one needs to specify a certain geodetic 
datum in order to take into account the curvature of the earth. A datum is often lacking in the older 
nautical charts that reflect a “pencil-and-ruler” approach. The level of sophistication of mapping 
technology determines the accuracy of the base points on baselines.  
 For purposes of maritime boundary delimitation based on nautical charts, the UN recommends 
that “in general the scale should be within the range 1:50,000 to 1:200,000.”7 Modern topographical 
techniques such as LiDAR, a surveying method that measures distance to a target by illuminating the 
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target with pulsed laser light and by measuring the reflected pulses with a sensor, can produce far more 
accurate maps reflecting sub-meter deviations. Nowadays, sophisticated boundary desktop mapping 
software such as CARIS-LOTS8 and satellite imagery can assist in the task of determining baselines 
with pinpoint accuracy, thereby contributing to the certainty and stability of maritime boundaries. This 
article applies the latest imaging techniques in combination with CARIS-LOTS in plotting the Canada-
US boundary in the Beaufort Sea. 
 A body of maritime delimitation case law has developed through some 25 decisions rendered by 
international courts and tribunals since 1969.9 These decisions allow for a “reverse-engineering” of 
adjudicated boundaries and the lessons from the case law can be applied to a given un-delimited 
boundary. In this article, we apply this technique and jurisprudential framework in analyzing the 
situation regarding the Canada-US boundary in the Beaufort Sea and in predicting a boundary that 
reflects “best law” and “best science.”  
 The section that follows first sets out the digital datasets that we have employed for this article. 
This will be followed by a description of the geographical and historical background relating to the 
unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea. This section will be followed by a summary, split into two 
sections, of the respective positions of Canada and the US with regard to the Beaufort Sea boundary 
based on publicly available documents and information. Following this summary, the next section 
identifies the oil and gas blocks that have been issued by the two countries in the area where they are 
claiming that the boundary in the Beaufort Sea is located. This is followed by a section describing the 
applicable legal framework and methodology underlying a jurisprudence-based resolution of the 
Canada-US boundary in the Beaufort Sea. For this purpose, we will apply the “three-step” methodology 
that has been developed in the maritime delimitation jurisprudence. The final section of this article 
presents our conclusions. 
 Assembling the Desktop Study 
For all law of the sea (LOS) projects pertaining to any of the 162 lake and coastal States, best practice 
dictates the assembly of a complete “LOS Desktop Study” (LOS-DTS). The maritime boundary being 
analyzed in detail will require a broader regional study of the area of interest (AOI) for the LOS-DTS 
datasets in order to allow for a larger area to be properly analyzed. For the LOS-DTS study developed 
for this article, a digital map, at scale 1: 7,500,000, was selected, in a UTM projection, Zone 7, with 
WGS84 Datum and 0.25 meters ground resolution. 
 The digital datasets used in assembling the Beaufort Sea LOS-DTS10 are set forth in Table 1 
below. 
A. Coastlines 
a. World Vector Shoreline (WVS) (1994) 11 (positionally accurate +/- 1000 meters and worse in 
the Arctic) 
b. WVS II (2004) 12 (positionally accurate +/- 100 meters and worse in the Arctic) 
B. “Territorial Sea Baseline Model” (TSBM) for Coastal States 
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12 See https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/shorelines/; accessed on 14 August 2018, 
a. US TSBM, not published (Gazetted) 
i. US only uses “Normal Baselines” for all LOS mathematical measurements (only “source” 
possible is from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) large-scale 
nautical charts by digitizing coastlines) 
b. Canadian TSBM (published (Gazetted)) 
i. Canada uses combinations of “Straight Baselines” and “Normal Baselines” 
C. LOS “Legal Limits” 
a. US: 0-3 nautical miles (NM) (State Limit) 
b. US: 3-12 NM (Federal Territorial Sea) 
c. US: 12-24 NM (Federal Contiguous Zone) 
d. US: 24-200 NM (Federal EEZ) 
e. Canada: 0-12 NM (Territorial Sea) 
f. Canada: 12-24 NM (Contiguous Zone) 
g. Canada: 24-200 NM (EEZ) 
D. Maritime Boundaries 
a. US vs Russia (west of LOS-DTS AOI), Treaty of 1 June 1990 
i. Following the maritime boundary line principle of a “Meridian Line” 
b. Canada vs Denmark (Greenland) 13 (east of LOS-DTS AOI), Treaty of 17 Dec. 1973 
i. Following the maritime boundary line principle of a “Strict Equidistance Line” 
c. US vs Canada (analysis for this LOS-DTS), unresolved (US Unilateral Line) 
i. Following the maritime boundary line principle of a “Strict Equidistance Line” 
d. Canada vs US (analysis for this LOS-DTS), unresolved (Canada Unilateral Line) 
i. Following the maritime boundary line principle of a “Meridian Line” 
E. Land Terminus Point (LTP) 
a. US Federal Register has Gazettted (published) geographic coordinate (Datum NA27) 14 
i. WGS84 (corrected) = 69-38-48.68229N / 141-00-04.70677W 
b. The official Canadian TSBM (1985) geographic coordinate (Datum NA27)15 (see Normal 
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Baseline Area 7-1 Demarcation Point) 
i. WGS84 (corrected) = 69-38-45.80899N / 141-00-12.00993W 
c. 1.0-meter Digital Globe 2018 (BING Maps) 
i. WGS84 = 69-38-47.10043N / 141-00-00.00000W16 
F. Use of US NOAA Nautical Charts17 
G. Use of modern-day Landsat TM818 (recent) imagery to (i) perform Quality Control (QC) 
checks, and (ii) interpret and update the TSBM for both the US and Canada19 
H. Regional Oil & Gas Blocks 
  
 Geographical and Historical Background 
 
 Geography and Topography 
 
The Beaufort Sea is an area of the Arctic Ocean situated along the northern coast of the US state of 
Alaska and Canada’s Yukon and Northwest Territories. This relatively shallow expanse of sea covers 
approximately 184,000 square miles,20 stretching from Point Barrow, Alaska, in the west, to Lands End, 
Prince Patrick Island, in the east.21 The unresolved Beaufort Sea boundary concerns a wedge-shaped 
section of that sea that sits north of the land border between Canada and the US. The disputed area, 
which measures around 6,250 square NM, is the segment lying within the 200-NM limit from the coast 
between (i) the 141st degree meridian line; and (ii) the “strict” equidistance line between the Canadian 
and US coasts. That equidistance line extends from the edge of the land border at a perpendicular angle 
to the coastline and falls east of the 141st degree meridian.22 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
15 See http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-85-872/page-1.html; accessed on 14 August 2018. 
16 For this LOS-DTS to be as accurate as possible, the above LTP was used for all calculations. As the Gazetted US LTP (a) and the Canadian Gazetted LTP 
(b) do not match, we will use (c). In the LOS-GIS, the US LTP is 70.6 meters northwest (in the water), and the Canadian LTP is 135.6 meters southwest (well 
inland). For LOS purposes, the LTP by definition is the exact land versus sea transition point. As neither the US LTP nor the Canadian LTP meets this 
criterion, a new one was chosen by us in order to improve the overall accuracy of the LOS-DTS. 
17 See http://www.charts.noaa.gov/InteractiveCatalog/nrnc.shtml; accessed on 14 August 2018. In all, 29 individual large-scale (1: 50,000) published NOAA 
ENC Digital (GIS-ready) nautical charts are available. These are recently published (all are dated 1 January 2015). However, the surveying used to make the 
charts, coastlines and nearshore shallow waters occurred during the period 1940–1969, so that all positional accuracies are questionable. For our LOS-DTS, 
14 individual NOAA nautical charts were used to review and analyze the entire US coastal waters. It is only this source that will offer exactly what the US 
Government uses for its non-gazetted Normal Baselines. 
18See https://lta.cr.usgs.gov/L8; accessed on 14 August 2018. 
19 In all, seven individual Landsat TM 2017 and 2018 satellite images were used in order to QC and/or update the missing Normal Baselines for both the US 
and Canada. The QC of the Canadian Straight Baselines showed that several locations were off (all less than 1,000 meters), which should be properly 
updated as they are based on old (1985) mapping standards. With advancement in technology, dramatic improvements can and likely would be achieved. 
However, for this LOS-DTS, as those were actual “Gazetted geographic coordinates,” they were simply used as-is. When and if a more detailed LOS-DTS is 
required, as this will take a greater amount of time to complete, it is advisable to get the updating done in order to increase the level of accuracy of the LOS-
DTS’ final results. The new 4D-SSM (Satellite Seafloor Morphology) image analysis technique was employed for some of the more critical offshore fringing 
islands along the US maritime frontier waters. See R van de Poll, Paper and PowerPoint Presentation OTC-29178-MS, ATC-OTC, 5 November 2018, 
available at http://otcnet.org/arctic; accessed 14 November 2018. For present-day, present-use US Normal Baselines (based on NOAA 2015 Large Scale 
Nautical Charts), that paper offers detailed analysis and findings for the US Normal Baselines, which can easily be off by as much as 2,500 meters on the 
ground. 
20 ‘Beaufort Sea’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica (Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.), available at https://britannica.com/place/Beaufort-Sea; accessed 9 August  
2018 [hereinafter Encyclopaedia Britannica]. 
21 International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas (3rd ed., 1953). 
22 M Byers and A Østhagen, ‘Why Does Canada Have So Many Unresolved Maritime Boundary Disputes?’ (2017) 54 Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law 1-62, at p. 12 [hereinafter Byers and Østhagen].  
 The surface of the Beaufort Sea presently remains entirely frozen for the majority of the year.23 
Some thawing occurs in the months of August and September, but only in those sections of the sea that 
are proximate to the coast.24 The sea sits atop a relatively narrow continental shelf, which extends no 
more than 90 kilometers from the mainland coast at any point. It is fed by dozens of rivers, including the 
Mackenzie that deposits around 15 million tons of sediment every year.25  
 Despite its harsh icy climate, the Beaufort Sea is home to a rich ecosystem of wildlife. Beluga 
and bowhead whales, polar bears, seabirds and an abundance of other migratory species can be found 
both above and below the sea ice.26 Human activity at present, by contrast, is relatively limited in the 
area. While melting sea ice has made this region of the Arctic Ocean increasingly accessible to fishing 
vessels, both Canada and the US have taken measures to curtail commercial fishing off their northern 
coasts, and currently only subsistence fishing and hunting for the supply of the local population takes 
place.27 In 1984, Canada entered into the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, in which the Canadian 
Government recognized, and undertook to protect, the fishing rights of the native Inuvialuit people 
living in the area.28  
 The most significant settlement along the coast, Prudhoe Bay in Alaska, serves as a hub for 
petroleum production workers, and it features the Trans-Alaska pipeline connecting Prudhoe Bay’s oil 
fields with the southern Alaskan port of Valdez.29 As detailed below, extensive hydrocarbon reserves 
have been discovered in the Beaufort Sea since the 1970s.30  
 Historical Background 
 
While the substance of the boundary disagreement between Canada and the US is derived from treaties 
concluded in the 19th century, the controversy itself did not materialize until the mid-1970s. It sprang 
from the delineation by each country of the territory it deemed to be within its 200-NM zone. In 1976 
and 1977, Canada and the US each contested the lines the other had used in drawing up its fisheries 
zones and granting oil and gas concessions in the Beaufort Sea.31 Prior to this point, and the introduction 
of the practice of claiming exploitation rights in a 200-NM exclusive economic zone (EEZ), coastal 
States had paid little attention to boundaries delimiting such a zone.32 
 The roots of the disagreement can be traced back to the conclusion by Russia and Great Britain 
of the 1825 Treaty of St. Petersburg, which concerned the regions that now form Alaska and Canada.33 
The treaty, originally written in French, dictated that the demarcation between the territories of Russia 
and Great Britain in the North-West of America be drawn along the 141st meridian and that this border 
was to extend “jusqu’à la Mer Glaciale” (in English, “as far as the Frozen Ocean”).34 The US acquired 
Russia’s rights under this treaty on 30 March 1867, when it purchased Alaska,35 while Canada inherited 
Great Britain’s treaty rights on 1 July 1867, when it gained independence as a sovereign State.36 
                                                          
23 Encyclopaedia Britannica (n 20). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
26 ‘Beaufort Sea: Connected, Protected, Respected: Conserving the Beaufort Sea Ecosystem’ (World Wildlife Fund Canada) available at 
http://www.wwf.ca/conservation/arctic/beaufort_sea/; accessed 13 August 2018. 
27 ‘Beaufort Sea commercial fishing banned’ (CBC) 15 April 2011, available at https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/beaufort-sea-commercial-fishing-
banned-1.1028286; accessed 13 August 2018. See also N Harley, ‘Russia and US join global pact to restrict fishing in thawing Arctic in deal to protect 
marine life’ The Telegraph, 3 December 2017, available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/02/arctic-fishing-banned-global-deal-protect-marine-
life/; accessed 13 August 2018. 
28 ‘Inuvialuit Final Agreement as Amended’ Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, 1984, available at 
https://www.inuvialuitland.com/resources/Inuvialuit_Final_Agreement.pdf; accessed 13 August 2018. 
29 Encyclopaedia Britannica (n 20). 
30 Byers and Østhagen (n 22), at p. 15. 
31 Ibid., at p. 11. See, generally, M Byers, International Law and the Arctic (1st paperback ed., Cambridge University Press, 2013) 56-91. 
32 D McRae, quoted in S Griffiths, ‘US-Canada Arctic border dispute key to maritime riches’ (BBC News) 10 August 2010, available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10834006; accessed 9 August 2018. 
33 Great Britain/Russia: Limits of their Respective Possessions on the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific Ocean, 16 February 
1825, 75 Consolidated Treaty Series 95. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Treaty concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, signed on 30 March 1867, available at 
 While the controversy over the Beaufort Sea boundary persists, one might better describe it as a 
“managed disagreement,” which has seen several attempts at reconciliation since it arose. Negotiations 
took place in 1977 and 1978 between Canada and the US with respect to four maritime boundaries, 
including the Beaufort Sea boundary.37 It has been reported that Canada entered these talks prepared to 
make concessions in respect of the Beaufort Sea boundary, in return for gains from the US in respect of 
other maritime boundaries, such as those in the Gulf of Maine.38 Ultimately, no such progress was made. 
With the US insisting on negotiating each boundary on an individual basis, and Canada fearful of setting 
legal precedents that could harm its position in other disputed areas, the two countries focused their 
attention on settling the most pressing of their boundary disagreements, namely, the Gulf of Maine 
boundary.39 
 Further talks occurred in 2010 and 2011 during Lawrence Cannon’s tenure as Canada’s Foreign 
Minister. However, these talks were halted, partly on the basis that both countries wished to gather more 
data on the extent of the existence of oil and gas deposits in the disputed area before cementing their 
negotiating positions.40 These talks took place against a backdrop of years of joint mapping exercises, in 
which Canadian and US scientists and coastguard officials worked together on expeditions aimed at 
gathering data for their respective ECS claims.41 In doing so, each country is seeking to collect proof 
demonstrating that the continental shelf stretches further into the Beaufort Sea than originally thought, 
and thereby increase the scope of their claims of sovereign rights over submerged territory under the 
technical provisions for making such a determination under the UNCLOS.42 
 Summary of Canada’s Position 
 
Canada’s position, at least as concerns the maritime area extending to 200 NM, is that the Beaufort Sea 
boundary should be delineated pursuant to the wording found in the 1825 Treaty of St. Petersburg. In 
Canada’s view, that wording should be interpreted as confirming that the land border separating Alaska 
in the US with the Yukon Territory in Canada continues out into the Arctic Ocean along the 141st 
meridian line.43 
 While Canada has shown some willingness to trade concessions with regard to the Beaufort Sea 
boundary during previous negotiations with the US, its position in respect of the correct placement of 
the boundary is cemented by a number of factors. One such factor, as referenced above, is that the 
Beaufort Sea is just one of several maritime boundary disagreements that Canada contends with, and in 
ceding ground in the one dispute it risks prejudicing itself in others. Another factor is the agreement 
reached by the Canadian government with the native Inuvialuit to protect their rights in the region.44 
This agreement uses the 141st meridian line to delineate the extent of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/treatywi.asp; accessed 14 November 2018. 
36 ‘Sovereignty & Security in Canada’s Arctic: Interim Report’ (Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, March 2011), at p. 33 
[hereinafter Interim Report]. 
37 Byers and Østhagen (n 22), at p. 5; Byers (n 31), at p. 62. 
38 Ibid., at p. 5. 
39 Ibid., at pp. 5-6. We note that there is no evidence suggesting that the purpose of the bilateral negotiations was simply to formalize a maritime boundary 
tacitly agreed upon between Canada and the US. Thus, an international tribunal unlikely would be tasked with determining whether a tacit maritime 
boundary exists between Canada and the US. The only case in which the existence of a tacit agreement was recognized was the case between Peru and Chile 
before the ICJ. See Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 3. 
40 See Case concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment of 
the Special Chamber, 23 September 2017, pp. 14-15, available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/C23_Judgment_23.09.2017_orig.pdf; accessed 28 August 2018 [hereinafter: 
Atlantic Judgment]. For a review of that ruling by the present authors, see P Bekker and R van de Poll, ‘Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire Receive a Strict-
Equidistance Boundary’ (2017) 21(11) ASIL Insights, 13 October 2017, available at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/11/ghana-and-cote-
divoire-receive-strict-equidistance-boundary; accessed 28 August 2018. 
41 B Baker, ‘Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea’ (2009) 34 Vermont Law Review 
34-57, at p. 57. 
42 S Griffiths, ‘US-Canada Arctic border dispute key to maritime riches’ (BBC News) 10 August 2010, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-
canada-10834006; accessed 9 August 2018. 
43 Interim Report (n 36), at p. 33. 
44 Inuvialuit Final Agreement (as amended), 1984, available at https://www.inuvialuitland.com/resources/Inuvialuit_Final_Agreement.pdf; accessed 13 
August 2018. 
and making boundary concessions to the US could consequently represent an infringement of Inuvialuit 
rights that are protected under Canadian law.45 
 Canada has been swift to condemn any perceived infringement of its sovereignty or sovereign 
rights in the area, as witnessed in 2016 when a proposal by the US Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management (BOEM) for new exploration leases in the disputed area was met by protest from Yukon’s 
authorities.46 
 There is some support in State practice and international jurisprudence for Canada’s position that 
the boundary in the Beaufort Sea should be delimited by reference to the 141st meridian line, i.e., based 
on the parallel-of-latitude method. Thus, the Arctic boundary between the US and Russia, lying to the 
west of the Beaufort Sea, extends north along the 168˚ 58’ 37” meridian through the Bering Strait and 
Chukchi Sea into the Arctic Ocean.47 In other words, the US appears to have applied the parallel-of-
latitude method in delimiting its maritime boundaries with third States in the region. In 2014, the ICJ 
held that there was an agreed maritime boundary between Peru and Chile extending to a distance of 80 
NM along the parallel of latitude passing through the starting-point of the Peru-Chile land border, while 
imposing a boundary line reflecting “strict” (i.e., unmodified) equidistance beyond 80 NM.48 At the 
same time, Canada appears to be advocating a “strict” equidistance line for its Arctic boundary with 
Greenland/Denmark, lying to the east of the Beaufort Sea. 
 In Figure 1, Canada’s position regarding the Canada-US boundary in the Beaufort Sea is 
represented by a straight dashed line. The line starts from the LTP, represented by a white star on the 
coastline. This unilateral line reflects one country’s position and follows the land border between 
Canada and the US along the 141st degree “line of longitude.” Canada simply projects the line seaward 
until it intersects the regional 200-NM (EEZ) legal limit. This type of computed maritime boundary line 
is based on the “sector line principle.” 
                                                          
45 Byers and Østhagen (n 22), at p. 18; Byers (n 31), at pp. 80-82. 
46 G. Sharp, “An old problem, a new opportunity: A case for solving the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute,” The Arctic Institute, 17 June 2016, Online, 
<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/an-old-problem-a-new-opportunity-a-case-for-solving-the-beaufort-sea-boundary-dispute/> (accessed 9 August 2018). It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether, by its acts, Canada or the US is estopped from objecting to a boundary based on equidistance or a 
parallel-of-latitude method, respectively, or whether there is acquiescence of any sort. 
47 The US and the USSR, the predecessor of the Russian Federation, concluded a maritime boundary treaty on June 1, 1990, but it is unclear whether that 
treaty has entered into force for the US and Russia.  A legal analysis of the US-Russia boundary in the Arctic is beyond the scope of the present paper. 

































 Summary of the US’ Position 
 
The US policy in respect of the Beaufort Sea is to recognize a boundary between itself and Canada in 
the Beaufort Sea based on equidistance, at least as concerns the maritime area extending to 200 NM.49 
That is to say, its delineation would put the sea boundary at a median line that extends from the edge of 
the land border at a perpendicular angle and at each point represents the middle point between the coasts 
of Canada and the US. In taking this position, the US rejects the interpretation of the wording of the 
1825 Treaty of St. Petersburg advocated by Canada. The US instead takes the view that the wording of 
the treaty intended the border to follow the 141st meridian up until the shoreline only, and that the 
equidistance principle of international law should be applied when extending the border out to sea.50 
Like Canada, it appears that the US’ ability to negotiate its position on the Beaufort Sea boundary has 
been tapered by a fear of creating precedents that may harm its position in other prevailing and future 
disputes, both with Canada and with other States.51 
 As mentioned above, the principle of equidistance is confirmed in the UNCLOS and in 
international jurisprudence. However, in contrast to Canada and all other Arctic circumpolar countries, 
                                                          
49 ‘National Security Presidential Directive / NSPD -- 66: Arctic Region Policy’ (The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 9 January 2009), at p. 6, 
available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.pdf; accessed 14 August 2018 [hereinafter National Security Presidential Directive]. 
50 Interim Report (n 36), at p. 33. 
51 Byers and Østhagen (n 22), at p. 5. 
the US is yet to ratify the UNCLOS.52 This means that the provisions of the UNCLOS, including those 
on the ECS, are not opposable to the US as treaty (conventional) law. The US Government’s official 
policy regarding the UNCLOS is that the US Senate should “act favorably” on the US’ prompt accession 
in order to protect and advance the US’ interests in the Arctic.53 As such, while not yet a party to the 
UNCLOS, the US has committed to “continue to support and observe principles of established 
customary international law reflected in the Convention.”54 
 Figure 1 also shows the boundary line up to 200 NM that we believe reflects the US’ position 
regarding the boundary with Canada in the Beaufort Sea, represented by a dashed line with Gazetted 
round symbols. The line starts from near the LTP identified by us elsewhere in this article. This 
unilateral line reflects one country’s position and was computed using both the US TSBM (i.e., Normal 
Baselines, represented by lines along US coastlines and coastal frontages to the left of the white star 
shown in Figure 1) as well as Canada’s TSBM (i.e., a combination of both Normal Baselines and 
Straight Baselines, represented by lines along Canadian coastlines and coastal frontages to the right of 
the white star shown in Figure 1).  
 As this line was described in an official Gazette,55 it is simply assumed that the US used all 
relevant regional baselines, similar to those as shown by us. For this LOS-DTS, and this specific 
unilateral line, the Gazetted coordinates were imported in the LOS-DTS and connected to produce the 
line as shown in Figure 1. This type of computed maritime boundary line is based on the “strict” 
(theoretical) equidistance line method. We note that, based on our detailed review of the LTP, the US 
Gazetted line does not start exactly on the LTP that was identified by us in the LOS-DTS, but appears to 
start offshore (in the water) at a distance of 70.6 meters northwest from this LOS-DTS’ suggested 
interpreted position, relying on 2018 data sources. 
 Figure 1 details the results for both the US and Canada based on their claimed maritime 
boundary lines, as they intersect the 200-NM EEZ limit. The close-shaped polygon area, commonly 
referred to as the “Area of Overlapping Claims” (AOC) is shown as 24,769.77 square kilometers 
(geodetic) or 7,213.93 square NM (geodetic). Offshore activities that take place inside these AOC 
waters run the risk or uncertainty of ownership of the seabed and related seabed resources associated 
with the disputed waters. 
 
 Oil and Gas Blocks in the Area of Overlapping Claims 
 
At the time of writing, and based entirely on third-party available datasets published by Drilling Info,56 
the following information regarding oil and gas blocks issued by Canada and the US can be identified in 
the AOC. 
 Figure 2 details the offshore concession blocks defined or opened for bid round by the BOEM, a 
US agency, at the time of writing. The image shows that the entire US claimed offshore maritime 
frontier is covered by “open” blocks. Some 15,469 individual offshore blocks are shown as small boxes. 
The actual present-day “issued” blocks, representing production sharing contracts (PSCs), total 526 
blocks.  
                                                          
52 National Security Presidential Directive (n 49). 
53 Ibid., at p. 5. See also Byers (n 31), at pp. 5-6. 
54 ‘National Strategy for the Arctic’ (The White House, 10 May 2013) available at 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf; accessed 14 August 2018. 
55 Federal Register (n 14). 
 
56 Fugro Group has an annual subscription to Drilling Info, a global database showing oil & gas concession blocks worldwide, as part of its Global Law of 




















 While difficult to see in the small-scale image in Figure 2, among the US “open” blocks lying in 
proximity to the computed hypothetical “strict” equidistance line, multiple blocks lie east of this 
produced line, i.e., they could be considered as “encroaching” into Canadian would-be waters if this line 
was adopted. Interestingly, the BOEM has laid out “open” blocks well beyond the US’ EEZ limit. 
Eventually, some or all of this could become US seabed under a US ECS claim, if successful. All 
present-day “issued” PSC blocks shown are nowhere near the yet-to-be-resolved Canada-US boundary. 
Therefore, for US offshore acreage held by IOCs, this does not appear to be an issue from a maritime 
boundary point of view.57 
 Figure 2 also details the offshore oil and gas concession blocks defined by the Canadian 
Government at the time of writing. The image shows only present-day “issued” PSC blocks. The 109 
individual offshore blocks are shown as small boxes. 
 While difficult to see in the small-scale image in Figure 2, the Canadian “issued” blocks lie in 
close proximity to the Canadian unilaterally claimed maritime boundary (sector) line, represented by the 
straight dashed line from this LOS-DTS. The actual PSC blocks do show some minor “mismatches” 
west of the computed line, i.e., they could be considered to be “encroaching” into US would-be waters if 
this line was adopted. 
                                                          
57 However, there is one possible issue, internal to the US, where State (0-3 NM waters) versus Federal (3-12 NM waters) could see positional mapping 
discrepancies, as present-day PSC blocks issued to IOCs likely do not lie in the waters (State versus Federal) based on older 1940-1960s mapping. A more 
detailed analysis goes beyond the scope of this article. 
 Figure 3 shows the Canadian “issued” offshore oil and gas blocks, defined as falling inside the 
AOC at the time of writing. Of the 109 “issued” PSC blocks (shown in Figure 2), five fall inside the 
AOC in whole or in part (closest to the meridian line) and present possible issues. Figure 3 also shows 
the 1,134 US “open” offshore blocks, defined by the BOEM, that fall inside the AOC. Although these 
US blocks are “open,” they do not present an immediate problem, at least not until such time that the US 
































 Jurisprudence-based Boundary Delimitation 
 
Article 33 of the UN Charter sets out the principal means for the UN member States, including Canada 
and the US, to settle their disputes peacefully based on the principle that all States enjoy sovereign 
equality.58 These means range from negotiation to adjudication by an international court or tribunal. In 
terms of policy options, coastal States with overlapping claims to maritime areas have a basic choice 
between finding a bilateral solution and seeking third-party assistance. The two disputing States can 
seek to delimit their maritime boundary, which is the most preferable solution, through bilateral 
negotiations or through non-binding conciliation or mediation by a third party. Alternatively, the 
boundary dispute can be submitted to a third-party adjudicated solution, either through ad hoc 
                                                          
58 Art. 2(1), UN Charter. 
arbitration or through adjudication by a standing tribunal, with the resulting decision being binding on 
both parties (but not on third States).59 
 The preferable method for delimiting the Canada-US boundary in the Beaufort Sea would be 
through the conclusion by the two States of a bilateral treaty specifying the coordinates of the maritime 
boundary separating their respective areas of sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction. A bilateral treaty is 
dependent upon the mutual consent of the sovereign parties and no sovereign State can be forced to 
conclude a treaty with another sovereign State. However, States, especially neighboring States, are 
under an international law obligation to act and negotiate in good faith.60 
 Under the law of the sea, different rules apply to the delimitation of territorial seas and the 
delimitation of an EEZ and the continental shelf. As regards the delimitation of the territorial sea 
between States with adjacent or opposite coasts, Article 15 of the UNCLOS provides that “neither of the 
two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond 
the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.” 
 Article 15 underscores that neighboring coastal States as a rule are to agree between themselves 
the limits of the territorial sea, a maritime area within which the coastal State exercises full sovereignty. 
In the event that they are unable to reach agreement, Article 15 dictates that the boundary in the 
territorial sea shall be the median line. However, this fall-back rule applies only in a situation where 
both States have ratified the UNCLOS. Not having ratified the UNCLOS, Article 15 is not opposable to 
the US. Still, Article 15 probably reflects contemporary customary international law and is binding on 
the US as such, unless the US were on record for consistently opposing the customary status of the rules 
embodied in Article 15. We are not aware of such opposition. As a matter of fact, it has been the 
constant policy of the US to apply the provisions of the UNCLOS de facto as a matter of policy. 
 The final sentence of Article 15 provides for an exception to the equidistance rule in the event of 
the existence of a historic title or other special circumstances dictating that equidistance not be applied 
to a territorial sea delimitation. 
 The 1958 Geneva Conventions do not address the EEZ, a relatively modern concept. Within the 
EEZ, which must be declared by a coastal State and cannot exceed 200 NM from the tidal low-water 
line of the coastal State, a coastal State may exercise exclusive sovereign rights over the natural 
resources of the water column. Under the UNCLOS, Canada, an UNCLOS signatory, has declared a 
200-NM EEZ, and so has the US. 
 As regards the continental shelf, the only legal instrument binding on Canada and the US is the 
CCS. According to Article 6 of the CCS, “[i]n the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary 
line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line (…).” Therefore, the 
continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea would be determined by an international court or tribunal according 
to a theoretical median (equidistance) line, unless there are “special circumstances” such as offshore 
islands or other maritime features. 
 The UNCLOS provides substantially identical rules with regard to the delimitation of the EEZ 
and the continental shelf. According to Article 74(1) of the UNCLOS, “[t]he delimitation of the 
exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be affected by agreement 
on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, in order to achieve an 
equitable solution.” In other words, States parties to the UNCLOS with overlapping claims over an EEZ 
are obligated to affect an EEZ delimitation through agreement, typically a treaty, and international law 
                                                          
59 Ibid., Art. 33. Also, as a rule, a delimitation between one of the parties and a third State cannot be considered relevant for the delimitation between the 
parties. See Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICJ, Judgment, 2 February 2018, para. 134, 
available at http://icj-cij.org; accessed 14 November 2018. 
60 See, e.g., Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para. 604. 
shall govern this process. The ICJ has held that Article 74, as well as Article 83 governing the 
continental shelf, reflect contemporary customary international law. These provisions can be said to be 
binding on Canada as conventional law and on the US as customary law.61 
 According to Article 74(2) and 83(2) of the UNCLOS, “[i]f no agreement can be reached within 
a reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.” 
Under Part XV, a State party to the UNCLOS may designate one of three compulsory procedures for 
settling a boundary dispute: (i) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS);62 (ii) the 
ICJ;63 and (iii) where designations made by States do not match, or in a situation where no declaration 
has been filed, the default is to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of 
the UNCLOS.   
 Not having ratified the UNCLOS, Part XV has no application in the relationship between Canada 
and the US. This means that Canada could not unilaterally institute proceedings over the Beaufort Sea 
dispute against the US before any of the afore-mentioned tribunals without the consent of the US. 
However, Canada could seek to conclude a Special Agreement with the US whereby the two States 
agree to submit their dispute over the Beaufort Sea boundary to a mutually acceptable tribunal, with the 
treaty providing the jurisdiction of the tribunal and defining the question to be settled by it. 
 Because the US has not ratified the UNCLOS, that treaty’s legal regime for determining ECS 
rights of coastal States does not apply to the US. The US is prevented from submitting scientific 
evidence to the CLCS, backing up its claim for an ECS in the Arctic waters of the Beaufort Sea and it 
cannot arrogate to itself the power to declare an ECS and impose its outer limits on Canada. The US is 
under a general international law obligation to negotiate in good faith with Canada over the two 
countries’ ECS boundary. Such negotiations could see the two countries taking different positions than 
those regarding the boundary within 200 NM. As can be seen from Figure 8, the “strict” equidistance 
method advocated by the US does not favor the US beyond 200 NM. An adjudicated ECS boundary 
would require the two countries to conclude a Special Agreement whereby they submit the question of 
their ECS boundary to an international court or tribunal.  
 Applicable Delimitation Law 
 
Whatever method for delimiting the Beaufort Sea boundary is applied or chosen, the Canada-US 
boundary is to be determined in accordance with international law.64 The universally accepted listing of 
the sources of that law is found in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.65 The specific legal rules that might 
govern the determination of the Canada-US boundary in the Beaufort Sea are subsumed under the rubric 
of Article 38(1)(a). They may be found in the particular agreements that may be or have been in effect 
between Canada and the US, especially bilateral and multilateral treaties.66 For purposes of this article, 
we have assumed that there is no bilateral treaty binding on Canada and the US that specifically and 
conclusively settles the maritime boundary separating Canada and the US in the Beaufort Sea. 
                                                          
61 See Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. 38, at p. 59, para. 48 [hereinafter 
Jan Mayen Judgment]. 
62 See https://itlos.org; accessed 28 August 2018. 
63 See https://icj-cij.org; accessed 28 August 2018. 
64 In the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the five circumpolar States (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US) that are member States of the Arctic Council 
confirmed that they “remain committed to this legal framework [applicable to the Arctic Ocean] and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping 
claims” over areas of the Arctic Ocean and that any steps taken will be “in accordance with international law.” Ilulissat Declaration, done at Ilulissat, 
Greenland, on 28 May 2008, available at https://arcticgovernance.org; accessed 26 August 2018. See also OR Young, ‘The Arctic in Play: Governance in a 
Time of Rapid Change’ (2009) 24(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 423. 
65 Article 38(1) stipulates that the sources to be applied by the ICJ shall be the following: “(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; (b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) The general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” Article 38(1) also provides that “[s]ubject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, [are to be applied] as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 
66 Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331), which reflects customary 
international law in many respects, defines a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international 
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” 
 One also must examine rules of general application that form a substantial part of what is termed 
“general international law.” These can be derived from the sources listed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, 
particularly multilateral treaties and customary international law, as evidenced by the practice of States. 
The general international law that is relevant in this context is the international law of the sea that 
applies to marine features. The classification of the Beaufort Sea as a sea properly so-called is beyond 
doubt: the Beaufort Sea is naturally connected to the oceanic waters of the world. As a maritime or 
oceanic sea, the international law of the sea is, of its own force, binding with regard to the Beaufort Sea. 
 The law of the sea is governed by a special treaty regime constituted, for those States having 
signed and ratified them, by the Geneva Conventions concluded in 1958 and the UNCLOS. Of the three 
relevant Geneva Conventions concluded in 1958, only the CCS67 is binding on both Canada and the US. 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone68 has been signed and ratified by the 
US, but Canada has only signed this treaty, meaning its provisions are not opposable to it in the 
relationship between Canada and the US. The same applies to the Convention on the High Seas,69 which 
has been signed and ratified by Canada, but the US has only signed it and hence is not bound by its 
provisions. 
 Even though the international law of the sea is applicable to the Beaufort Sea as an oceanic 
maritime feature and notwithstanding the fact that the UNCLOS is not, on its own force, applicable to 
the US, some of the provisions of the UNCLOS have passed into customary international law and have 
acquired obligatory status as customary international law. This includes the delimitation principles 
included in Part II of the UNCLOS. Where the rules for delimiting the various zones of maritime 
jurisdiction described in the UNCLOS would result in the overlapping of the jurisdictional zones of 
States having adjacent or opposite coasts, the UNCLOS provides that the territorial sea should be 
delimited by agreement, or failing agreement, by a theoretical median (equidistance) line. Exceptions are 
to be made for “historic title or other special circumstances.”70 Under the UNCLOS, delimitation of 
EEZs and the continental shelf between States with adjacent or opposite coasts also is to be 
accomplished by agreement.   
 The delimitation principles included in Part II of the UNCLOS can serve as a useful starting-
point for future negotiation by Canada and the US of the baselines for establishing the precise 
boundaries of the areas of sovereign jurisdiction within the presently un-delimited areas of the Beaufort 
Sea. As noted above, the ICJ has held that the substantially identical delimitation provisions of Articles 
74 and 83 of the UNCLOS reflect customary international law.71 As such, they could be considered to 
be binding on the US as general international law and supplement the CCS.72   
 While no clear or consistent set of rules can be perceived in this area, an international tribunal 
likely would apply, in addition to the CCS, customary international law of the sea rules to determine the 
rights and obligations of Canada and the US with regard to their unresolved boundary in the Beaufort 
Sea. These would include, especially in a situation of natural resources straddling an international 
boundary, the general standards of comity, good faith and good neighborliness in relationships between 
neighboring States as well as the general rules of State responsibility for direct and indirect damage to 
the property and territory of a neighboring State by reason of negligent or willful conduct of the first 
State. While no hard-and-fast rules exist with regard to straddling deposits, the neighboring States can 
be said to have an obligation to notify or consult each other upon discovery of such deposits as well as 
an obligation to cooperate and to exercise mutual restraint. While contemporary international law does 
                                                          
67 Convention on the Continental Shelf (n 6). 
68 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Geneva, in force 10 September 1964) 516 UNTS 205. 
69 Convention on the High Seas (Geneva, in force 30 September 192) 450 UNTS 11. 
70 Art. 15, UNCLOS (n 3). 
71 See Jan Mayen Judgment (n 61), at p. 59, para. 48. 
72 While the US considers many of the provisions of the UNCLOS to constitute customary international law on the law of the sea and binding on it as such, it 
is unclear whether or not this applies to the delimitation provisions of the UNCLOS. 
not recognize a duty to jointly develop or to unitize a cross-border reservoir, there is an affirmative duty 
to seek agreement toward cooperative exploitation of the straddling deposits.73  
 Applicable Delimitation Methodology 
 
The rules and principles set forth in some 25 decisions rendered by various international courts and 
tribunals in maritime boundary cases since 196974 can be applied to a given disputed or un-resolved 
boundary in order to make informed predictions regarding its outcome. The same applies to the Canada-
US controversy regarding their maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea. 
 Certainty, equity and stability are key elements and integral parts of the delimitation process 
before an international court or tribunal. Reflecting these elements, an international court or tribunal 
charged with adjudicating the un-resolved maritime boundary between Canada and the US can be 
expected to employ the established three-stage approach in applying the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances methodology when fixing the boundary in the Beaufort Sea.75 Based on this approach and 
methodology, after identifying the relevant coasts with a view to determining the parties’ overlapping 
claims and the relevant area within which the delimitation is to be effected and in which the projections 
of the parties’ coasts overlap, a provisional delimitation line is established. In the majority of cases, this 
has been an equidistance line, drawn by reference to appropriate baselines.76 This constitutes Stage 1 of 
the maritime delimitation methodology.  
 In Stage 2 of the delimitation process, the provisionally constructed line is examined in the light 
of equitable factors, called “relevant circumstances,” so as to determine whether it is necessary to adjust 
or shift that line in order to achieve an equitable solution. As the ITLOS Special Chamber observed in 
the Atlantic Judgment, “[t]he overarching objective of maritime delimitation … is to achieve an 
equitable solution.”77 The case law favors neutral factors of a geographical nature,78 such as a significant 
disparity between the length of the parties’ coastlines within the area to be delimited, over area-specific 
factors such as oil concessions and oil activities.79 Physical seabed characteristics (geology) and socio-
economic considerations are general rejected as special/relevant circumstances justifying the shifting or 
adjustment of the provisional delimitation line. 
 Finally, and at Stage 3, an international tribunal will verify that the unadjusted or adjusted 
provisional line does not, as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by reason of a marked disproportion 
between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime areas of 
each State by reference to the delimitation line.80 Thus, the ultimate delimitation involves the application 
of a final proportionality check to verify the equitableness of the tentative delimitation and to ensure that 
the ultimate result is not tainted by some form of gross disproportion. The application of this 
                                                          
73 As the ICJ held in a landmark decision rendered in 1969, “[a]nother factor to be taken into consideration in the delimitation of areas of continental shelf as 
between adjacent States is the unity of any deposits.” North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Denmark/Fed. Rep. of Germany; Netherlands/Fed. Rep. of 
Germany), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at p. 51, para. 97. 
74 While there are rulings by international tribunals that pre-date the February 1969 judgments of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and that 
are of certain relevance, the development of the international maritime delimitation jurisprudence can be said to have commenced in earnest in 1969, when 
the ICJ spelled out the relevant rules and principles applicable to the delimitation of maritime boundaries in its rulings rendered in parallel cases between 
Germany and Denmark and The Netherlands, respectively. 
75 Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para 360; Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICJ, Judgment, 2 
February 2018, para. 135, available at http://icj-cij.org; accessed 14 November 2018. 
76 According to the ITLOS Special Chamber, “the international jurisprudence concerning the delimitation of maritime spaces in principle favours the 
equidistance/relevant circumstances methodology” and “in the absence of any compelling reasons that make it impossible or inappropriate to draw a 
provisional equidistance line, the equidistance/relevant circumstances methodology should be chosen for maritime delimitation.” Ibid., at para. 289. 
77 Ibid., at para. 409. 
78 Ibid., at para. 453. 
79 Ibid., at para. 215 (“the proof of the existence of a maritime boundary requires more than the demonstration of longstanding oil practice or adjoining oil 
concession limits”). 
80 See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61, at p. 103, para. 122; Delimitation of the maritime 
boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2012, p. 4, at p. 123, para. 477; Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para. 533 
(referring to earlier jurisprudence). 
“disproportionality test” could result in an offshore island being given only “half effect,” or even no 
effect, in the delimitation.81 
 Identifying the Relevant Area 
 
An international tribunal charged with delimiting a maritime boundary will commence the delimitation 
process by determining what is called the “relevant area.” It does so by identifying the geographical 
context of the delimitation, including relevant coasts, protrusions and offshore features such as islands 
and shoals in the AOC. Disputing States often advance differing views on the extent of the relevant area. 
As the ITLOS Special Chamber pointed out in the Atlantic Judgment, “[f]or a coast to be considered 
relevant in maritime delimitation it must generate projections which overlap with those of the coast of 
another party.”82 With regard to the Beaufort Sea, the relevant coasts in the “relevant area” are 
represented by the area in which the projections of the coasts of Canada and the US overlap. 
 In the absence of claims formally submitted by both parties as part of international arbitral or 
judicial proceedings, the parties’ positions regarding the disputed boundary and, hence, the relevant area 
within which a third-party delimitation is to be affected cannot be formulated with accuracy. This also 
applies to the Beaufort Sea. Hence, it is difficult to define the relevant coasts and relevant area in the 
present case. In such circumstances, outside experts or commentators are left to construe the parties’ 
positions based on publicly available sources in an effort to simulate the important preliminary step that 
international courts and tribunals apply in fixing a maritime boundary in an area of overlapping claims. 
One also must take into account that the outer limits of the continental shelves of Canada and the US 
have not been determined definitively. This means that it is only possible to give an approximation of 
the size of the relevant area in this case. Thus, the relevant area in the ECS is delimited by a line running 
from the relevant basepoint until it reaches the outer limits of the continental shelf of each of the two 
countries.83 For practical purposes, we have employed a random 400-NM limit in construing the relevant 
area. The relevant area in this case covers approximately 400,000 square kilometers. The length of the 
relevant US coast is 323 kilometers and that of Canada is 1,063 kilometers.  
 Applying the Three-Step Methodology 
 
  Step 1: Fixing the Provisional Boundary in the Beaufort Sea 
 
It has become the practice of international courts and tribunals charged with delineating boundaries to 
draw a single, “multi-purpose” boundary, i.e., one uninterrupted boundary line delimiting the various 
zones of coincident jurisdiction appertaining to the disputing parties.84 In the case of the Beaufort Sea, 
these zones include the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf within and beyond 200 NM.  
As stated above, in the majority of adjudicated boundary cases, a provisional delimitation line in the 
form of an equidistance line (for States with adjacent coasts) or a median line (for States with opposite 
coasts) is established by reference to appropriate base points or baselines. Thus, the next step in the 
delimitation process involves the selection of baselines for establishing the provisional equidistance line 
“on the basis of the geographic particularities of the coast under consideration.”85 
Figure 4, which uses Landsat TM8 (scale 1: 375,000) 30-meter ground resolution, shows the 1985 
published (Gazetted) Canadian Straight Baselines (connected lines) and also, for some portions along 
Canadian offshore islands, the interpreted Low Water Lines (LWL), which are the Normal Baselines 
                                                          
81 See Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para. 285. 
82 Ibid., at para. 372. 
83 Cf. ibid., at paras. 382-385. In line with the practice followed in the Atlantic Judgment, we computed the length of the relevant coastlines by taking the 
WVS data and removing those indentations that would normally be closed by Straight Baselines. Ibid., at para. 380. 
84 See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/US), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 246, at p. 267, para. 27. Canada and the US 
likely would not favour a single boundary for the Beaufort Sea, given that, as we demonstrate in this article, "each of their positions within 200 nautical 
miles would seem to favor the other party further out." Byers (n 31), p. 91. 
85 Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para. 393. 
shown as dotted lines. The actual “Gazetted” Canadian Straight Baselines were used “as-is” in this LOS-
DTS, as they generally matched the available present-day imagery. The Canadian Normal Baselines 
were simply digitized using recent Landsat TM8 images.86 Ideally, both the Straight and Normal 
Baselines should be updated for the US and Canada, as positionally the 1985 mapped locations would 



















Figure 5, which includes three inset images, details “old mapping versus new mapping” for one of many 
offshore fringing (barrier) islands situated at vast stretches of the US coastal waters along Alaska. All 
US (Alaskan) Normal Baselines used for all US LOS limits and boundaries calculations result from 
present-day nautical charts produced by NOAA. The top image in Figure 5 is a 1:20,000 scale zoom-in, 
showing some US islands (the Midway Islands) from Nautical Chart 16061.87 It appears that these 





                                                          
86 Although Canada “gazettes” where the coastal area “will make use of Normal Baselines,” it does not actually supply (publish) all the individual points. 























The centre inset in Figure 5 is a 4D-SSM (Satellite Seafloor Morphology) image from the Fugro LOS 
database.88 This is a new technique used for remote mapping and shallow-water hazard mapping 
applications. It offers extremely useful present-day updated coastline interpretations and results, as well 
as nearshore-foreshore shallow-water seabed morphological feature information, such as sandbars, 
islets, reefs and rocks. This 4D-SSM image was additionally contoured in order to show the accurate 
interpreted “outer edge of the island,” i.e., coastline.  
                                                          
88 A new technique for 4D (i.e., 3D plus a time component possible, making 4D) as Landsat TM8 Imagery (15.0-meter ground resolution) is processed 
through a variety of proprietary customized tools and rendered in 3D in the LOS-GIS for analysis. This new technique, created by Robert van de Poll as part 
of his LOS projects, has been tested in more than 750 projects worldwide, and with very consistent results, showing that this new SSM (Satellite Seafloor 
Morphology), depending on source quality of imagery available, can “see” seabed features to a maximum depth of 25.0 meters. This Images is not showing 
Bathymetry. But rather Morphology of the seabed. In this example, the produced results were “contoured” to accurately produce updated (interpreted) 2018 
coastlines for the fringing (barrier) island. The source data in this specific example came from a Landsat TM8 image collected on 30 July 2018.  
 
The bottom inset in Figure 5 shows the results of how 67-78-year-old mapping compares to present-day 
mapping, using this new 4D-SSM technology. The sandy island has grown by 369% and coastlines 
show improvements of up to 1,500 meters in this example. Present-day remapping of all of the US 
Normal Baselines by using this technique would dramatically improve all regional measurements for 
LOS legal limits. 
Figure 8 details the regional LOS-DTS area, applying “strict” equidistance line methodology from the 
Fugro database and using new updated (suggested) Normal Baselines for both the US and Canada, 
where applicable. It is based on present-day analysis of regional coastlines using WVS and WVSII 
datasets, and then cross-referenced to all available nautical charts. Additionally, multiple modifications 
were made, using present-day Landsat TM8 satellite images. In some cases, advanced techniques of new 
4D-SSM image analysis were used to refine some US Normal Baselines.   
Ideally, this would be completed in survey-quality detail. All of this hierarchy of improved datasets was 
used in the LOS-DTS software to produce a suggested boundary line in the Beaufort Sea. This line was 
actually computed out to a limit of 400 NM by simply “doubling” the 200-NM EEZ limit so as to cover 
future ECS waters as well.  
This mathematically (geodetically) produced line starts from the LTP, represented by a white star in 
Figure 8. This is to be considered as a “Hypothetical Line,” offered in our LOS-DTS as an unbiased 
present-day calculated result, employing recognized LOS-GIS software, and using the “computed and 
interpreted” Normal Baselines for both the US and Canada along coastlines and coastal frontages, 
together with the “as-is” (Gazetted) Straight Baselines for Canada along coastlines and coastal frontages 
to the east of the white star. For this LOS-DTS, an entire new line was produced. Although in close 
proximity in some locations to the US’ declared line, this line is seen to have discrepancies with the 
resulting computed line of up to 5,323 meters. This type of computed boundary line is based on the 
“strict” equidistance line principle. It is also useful to see how the “geometry” of the line dramatically 
changes as the line crosses the EEZ limit of 200 NM into the yet-to-be-claimed ECS waters.  
As both the US’ and Canadian ECS claims still have to be produced and formally submitted in final 
form, having this “strict” equidistance line (here computed to 400 NM for ease of reference) will help 
when considering what boundary line within the EEZ is most representative, as both the US and Canada 
have differing views regarding the position of that line. 
Figure 689 details the LTP for the US versus Canada, as the starting-point for the un-resolved boundary 
between the two countries in the Beaufort Sea. The white star LTP is “interpreted,” in the LOS-GIS 
software, as it “sits” exactly on the 141st-degree meridian line reflected in the 1825 Treaty of St. 
Petersburg. As this is the most recent and highest-resolution image available (without actually putting 
“boots on the ground” to conduct field surveys), the Northing was interpreted at the land versus sea 
interface (i.e., the legal definition of the LTP, and the critical starting-point for analysis in this LOS-
DTS), for the various scenarios for the boundary line. The black star in Figure 6 denotes where Canada’s 
official “Gazetted” LTP sits, while the grey star shows where the US’s “Gazetted” LTP is located (both 




                                                          






















In line with established jurisprudence, any base points used for the construction of a provisional 
equidistance line in principle must be situated at the tidal low-water line.90 Using CARIS-LOTS 
software, baselines can be identified for Canada and the US in the Beaufort Sea. Figure 7 shows the 
relevant coastal frontages as follows: one large arrow for the US, including the US TSBM (Normal 








                                                          




















Figure 7 details the regional LOS-DTS area for the US versus Canada and the maritime frontier setting 
for the un-resolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea and coastal projections used in defining the relevant 
area. The relevant US coastlines are shown, with the interpreted Normal Baselines, using combinations 
of the available NOAA nautical charts and more recent modern-day Landsat TM8 satellite imagery. The 
relevant Canadian coastlines are also shown, with the Gazetted Straight Baselines (straight lines along 
jagged/irregular coastlines and crossing bays), together with some Normal Baselines along smooth 
coastal sections. These US and Canadian baselines were used to produce the (geodetic) 200-NM EEZ 
legal limits (see black line well offshore) for the regional LOS-DTS area. The LTP, as interpreted for 
this LOS-DTS, is also shown in the form of a white star. 
It appears that there are no clear circumstances in this case dictating the use of a method other than 
equidistance/relevant circumstances.91 
Having determined that delimitation of the area of overlapping claims could be satisfactorily 
accomplished by constructing a provisional equidistance line, we applied CARIS-LOTS, the software 
for plotting boundaries and customarily applied by (parties before) international courts and tribunals in 
                                                          
91 Applying the bisector method could be appropriate in a case featuring a limited number of base points and their location on an unstable coastline that is not 
representative of the overall coastal geography or where the maritime area off the relevant coasts is geographically complex, making it difficult to identify 
base points. However, it appears that these circumstances are not present in this case. It cannot be said that the relevant coasts of Canada and the US are 
unstable, such that it is difficult or impossible to identify base points. 
boundary cases,92 to identify a starting-point, represented by the land terminus resulting from the 1825 
Treaty of St. Petersburg, and we selected baselines for the boundary line to be construed. 
Figure 8 shows the resulting boundary, which starts from the land terminus resulting from the 1825 
Treaty of St. Petersburg and includes a number of turning points at which the direction of the line 
changes and which are connected by geodetic lines. From the northern-most turning point at 200 NM 
measured from the land terminus, the equidistance boundary continues as a geodetic line until it reaches 




















As regards the course of the line delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 NM, it was observed in the 
Atlantic Judgment that “there is in law only a single continental shelf.”93 Without fixing a termination 
point, this segment of the boundary can be said to run in a northwestern direction from the line within 
200 NM and continues in that direction until it reaches the outer limits of the continental shelf. 
In the case of the un-resolved Canada-US boundary in the Beaufort Sea, a “strict” equidistance line 
would take the shape as indicated in Figure 8. Figure 8 shows the individual turning points (represented 
                                                          
92 See, e.g., Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at paras. 389, 392. 
93 Ibid., at para. 490. See also ibid., paras. 373, 526. 
by round symbols connected together to create the suggested “hypothetical” line), as tied back through 
construction lines, to the respective territorial sea baselines (basepoints) for both the US and Canada.94 
  Step 2: Determining the Presence of “Relevant Circumstances” 
 
Maritime boundary cases often involve, and are triggered by, competing claims to natural resources, and 
the case of the unresolved Beaufort Sea boundary is no different. International courts and tribunals have 
affirmed the cautious treatment that generally has been given to non-geographical, resource-related 
criteria when considering relevant circumstances that might justify adjusting or shifting a provisional 
equidistance line in cases where drawing such a line is feasible. As summarized by the ITLOS Special 
Chamber in the Atlantic Judgment, “international courts and tribunals have been consistent in their 
reluctance to consider oil concessions and oil activities as relevant circumstances justifying the 
adjustment of the provisional delimitation line.”95 
With the possible exception of any pronounced concavity of coastlines on the Canadian side (in a 
situation where an international court or tribunal upholds a US challenge to Canada’s use of Straight 
Baselines), we have been unable to identify any argument that an adjustment or shifting of a provisional 
equidistance line would be required in the present case based on “relevant circumstances.” Strict 
application of the equidistance method would appear to result in an equitable solution in this case. The 
overarching objective of achieving an “equitable solution” reflects the result dictated by the UNCLOS 
for boundaries in maritime areas lying beyond the territorial sea. We believe that the line constructed by 
us does not lead to an inequitable result owing to a marked disproportion between the ratio of the 
respective coastal lengths (here, 1:3.29 in favor of Canada) and the ratio of the relevant maritime area 
allocated to each party (here, 1:2.20 in favor of Canada).96 
   Step 3: Applying a Final Disproportionality Check 
 
Taking into account all the circumstances of the case as we understand them based on publicly available 
information, we believe that the result achieved by the application of the delimitation line suggested in 
this article does not entail such disproportionality as to create an unequitable result.  
The size of the total area for the relevant waters has been calculated by us to be approximately 346,185 
square kilometers (geodetic).97 The delimitation line produced by us allocates approximately 237,865 
square kilometers (geodetic) to Canada and 108,320 square kilometers (geodetic) to the US. The ratio of 
the allocated maritime areas is approximately 1:2.20 in favor of Canada. Based on the maritime 
delimitation jurisprudence, this ratio does not lead to any significant disproportion in the allocation of 
maritime areas to the two countries relative to the respective lengths of their relevant coasts.  
 Agree-to-Disagree: Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature 
 
Pending final delimitation of an EEZ or continental shelf or resolution of an un-delimited boundary, 
States parties to the UNCLOS are required to “make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements 
of a practical nature” in order to avoid conflict in an area of overlapping claims.98 It is unsettled whether 
this rule reflects customary international law and would be binding on the US as such. There is no 
                                                          
94 Thee geometry of these relevant coastal features was used to produce the suggested (geodetic) “strict” equidistance line in this LOS-DTS. 
95 Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para. 476. According to the ITLOS Special Chamber, “a de facto line or modus vivendi related to oil practice cannot per se be 
a relevant circumstance in the delimitation of an all-purpose maritime boundary with respect to superjacent water as well as the seabed and subsoil.” Ibid., at 
para. 477. 
96 We note that, in any case involving concavity of relevant coasts, an international tribunal would consider whether an equidistance line drawn between two 
coastal States produces a cut-off effect on the maritime entitlement of one of those States, necessitating an adjustment of that line. See Atlantic Judgment (n 
40), at para. 421. In cases where concavity is not very pronounced, and any cut-off only comes into being at a considerable distance from the land boundary 
terminus (150 NM or more), an adjustment of a provisional equidistance line is less likely. Ibid, at para. 424. We have not considered any possible cut-off 
effect in the present case. 
97 The area that was calculated for this purpose was measured from the relevant coastal frontages of Canada and the US to the 200-NM 
limit.  
98 Arts. 74(3) and 83(3), UNCLOS (n 3). 
specific obligation under general international law to enter into a particular provisional arrangement, 
which may include joint development of mineral resources, cross-border unitization of mineral 
resources, the designation of special areas for fisheries purposes and various forms of bilateral 
cooperation, such as coordinated patrolling. 
 The recent Atlantic Judgment is especially instructive regarding the legal obligations of 
neighboring coastal States with active offshore oil blocks but lacking an agreed boundary or a 
provisional arrangement for joint exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons pending agreement on 
the common boundary.99 The rules and principles identified in that ruling can serve as a useful starting-
point for future negotiation by Canada and the US of some kind of arrangement that would allow for the 
joint development of any straddling resources within the presently un-delimited areas of the Beaufort 
Sea pending final delimitation of the Beaufort Sea boundary.100 
 Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to demonstrate, by reference to “best science” and “best law,” how an 
international court or tribunal with competent jurisdiction over the disagreement between Canada and 
the US regarding their maritime boundary in Arctic waters in the Beaufort Sea would analyze the 
situation with a view to arriving at an adjudicated boundary that reflects an equitable result based on 
equitable principles. This situation, or at least its legal analysis, is complicated by reason of the fact that 
the two countries are not both parties to the UNCLOS, meaning that this treaty is not of its own force 
applicable to Canada and the US, and they have yet to publicize their full legal positions. However, the 
delimitation rules and principles set forth in the UNCLOS can be considered to reflect customary 
international law binding on non-parties such as the US and there is a substantial body of case law 
interpreting and applying those rules and principles that can be relied on as authoritative statements.  
If the equidistance method were to be applied to the Canada-US boundary in the Beaufort Sea,101 it 
appears to support the US position regarding the boundary delimitation method applicable in the 
Beaufort Sea, except that the eventual “strict” equidistance line might deviate from the coordinates of 
the equidistance line favored by the US and might not favor the US beyond 200 NM. It remains to be 
seen whether, in applying this method and faced with all available proof submitted by the parties, an 
international tribunal would opt for a “strict” equidistance line as opposed to a “modified” equidistance 
line that takes into account relevant circumstances such as concavity of coastlines and the presence of 
offshore islands and other maritime features of a geographical nature. 
In this case, we have been unable to identify any compelling reasons that make it impossible or 
inappropriate to draw a provisional equidistance line in the Beaufort Sea, taking into account the 
coastlines and offshore maritime features in the relevant area to be delimited based on available 
mapping and satellite imagery. Moreover, while we have not researched the situation “on-the-ground” in 
the area of overlapping claims and do not have the benefit of the full positions of Canada and the US 
with regard to their claimed boundary in the Beaufort Sea such as would emerge from international 
proceedings, we have been unable to identify any relevant circumstances, of the kind identified in the 
international jurisprudence, that would call for the adjustment or shifting of a provisional equidistance 
line in the Beaufort Sea. In particular, any oil concessions and oil activities could not be considered as 
relevant circumstances and we have been unable to identify compelling evidence of a tacit agreement 
regarding a de facto line based on oil activities of the two countries.102 Finally, application of the 
                                                          
99 In the Atlantic Judgment (n 40), the ITLOS Special Chamber emphasized that Article 83(1) of the UNCLOS imposes an obligation to negotiate in good 
faith, and that the exercise of good faith is especially relevant where neighboring States are conducting maritime activities in close proximity to one another. 
Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para. 604. 
100 See also Byers (n 31), at pp. 88-89. 
101 Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para. 289. 
102 Ibid., at paras. 198-227, para. 215 (“oil practice, no matter how consistent it may be, cannot in itself establish the existence of a tacit agreement on a 
maritime boundary.”); Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, 2007 
I.C.J. 659, at p. 735, para. 253; Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahirya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18 (de facto line used by both parties in prior 
grants of concessions).  
disproportionality test does not dictate an outcome that is at variance with “strict” equidistance. In sum, 
a “strict” equidistance line would appear to be an equitable result in the Beaufort Sea and in line with 
both conventional and customary international law. 
While the preferable method for resolving the “managed disagreement” regarding the Beaufort Sea 
boundary would be for Canada and the US to conclude a boundary agreement based on rules and 
methods established in the practice of States and international jurisprudence,103 they also could “agree-
to-disagree” on their Beaufort Sea boundary and resort to provisional arrangements of a practical nature, 
including through joint development of hydrocarbons in the area of overlapping claims in the Beaufort 
Sea. There is ample evidence from State practice, including more than 35 joint development 
arrangements of varying kinds, that such solutions can be beneficial to both States and foster optimum 
development of straddling deposits. Recent jurisprudence provides useful guidance regarding the 
applicable rules and principles in concluding such arrangements.104 
In sum, there is no reason why the “managed disagreement” regarding the Canada-US maritime 
boundary in the Beaufort Sea could not be resolved peacefully or could stand in the way of exploration 
and exploitation of the natural resources in the Beaufort Sea in a manner that is beneficial to the two 
countries and their peoples, including indigenous communities, while serving as a catalyst for the 
peaceful and equitable resolution of other Arctic boundaries that remain to be delimited. 
                                                          
103 Concluding a boundary agreement based on a delimitation methodology applied by international courts and tribunal in recent decades would satisfy “the 
principle of transparency and predictability.” Atlantic Judgment (n 40), at para. 289. 
104 Ibid., at paras. 596-634. 
